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This paper shows that the design of education policy involves a potential conflict between 
welfare and social mobility. We consider a setting in which social mobility is maximized 
under the least elitist public education system, whereas welfare maximization calls for the 
most elitist system. We show that when private education is available, the degree of elitism 
that maximizes social mobility increases, while the welfare-maximizing degree of elitism 
decreases. The ranking between the welfare- and mobility-maximizing degree of elitism may 
even be reversed. Utilitarian welfare is always higher when private supplementary education 
is available, but social mobility may be reduced. 
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The literature on education often advocates ￿elitist￿policies. The standard approach
is to consider a population of individuals who di⁄er in their ability to bene￿t from
education. This heterogeneity typically implies a rather regressive distribution of public
education: resources are concentrated on the most able individuals in order to get a
￿cake￿as big as possible to share among individuals through income taxation; see e.g.,
Brett and Weymark (2008), Bruno (1976), Hare and Ulph (1979) and Ulph (1977).1
This recommendation relies on the assumption that education is not the only channel
of policy intervention; there is also in a second stage an income tax that can alter social
welfare.2 If the exercise is restricted to the ￿rst stage, the solution is di⁄erent and
tends to be less regressive. This is shown for instance by Arrow (1971) who studies
the optimal distribution of a given amount of public expenditure among individuals
di⁄ering in their learning ability without accounting for the possibility of subsequent
income redistribution. Note that this elitist distribution e⁄ect is mitigated when we
introduce decreasing returns of educational spending.3
The literature that recommends elitism in education typically concentrates on a
single generation. Consequently, the issue of social mobility does not arise. In reality,
however, social mobility is often considered as an important issue for the assessment
of education policies (Grossman and Kim (2003), Mejia and St-Pierre (2008), Speciale
(2007), Iannelli and Paterson (2005) and the references therein). It is often valued for
its own sake and independently of e¢ ciency or (intragenerational) equity concerns. To
understand the underlying problem suppose (just for the sake of the argument) that
learning ability is transmitted by parents. We could end up with an educational policy
that indeed maximizes social welfare at each period of time but at the expense of social
mobility. Would such an outcome be acceptable? This is the issue dealt with in this
paper. But ￿rst let us consider some basic facts.
1In a recent paper Cremer et al. (2009) put forward another reason to push for regressive education. It
is not linked to heterogeneity in innate ability to bene￿t from education but to pervasive non-convexities
that arise in the optimal income tax problem when individual productivities depend on education.
2See also De Fraja (2002) and Cremer and Pestieau (2006).
3Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005) and Maldonado (2007).
1When looking at the educational system of relatively similar countries in terms
of GDP, one is surprised by their wide heterogeneity. To characterize it, one can use
the amount of expenditure devoted to education, the degree of elitism and the relative
involvement of private market. We focus on the last two characteristics. The design of an
educational system is an important, but also controversial and complex issue. Important
because economic and human development are known to be crucially a⁄ected by the level
and the structure of human capital. Controversial because nobody wants to admit that
his educational system is elitist, even though this is often the case. Complex because
it is not easy to measure the degree of elitism of an educational system. Measuring
it by the way resources are allocated among students of di⁄erent origins and learning
capacities is not useful. What matters is the e⁄ective outcome, for example, the level of
knowledge achieved by students of a given age.
Hanushek and Woesmann (2007) consider the share of students in each country that
reach a certain threshold of basic literacy and the share of students that surpass a
threshold of top performance. The ￿rst share can be used as a proxy for egalitarianism
and the second as a proxy for elitism. Taking, in the sample of Hanushek and Woesmann,
countries that have about the same GDP and the same relative level of educational
spending, one observes that they di⁄er quite a lot. For instance, the ratio of ninth
decile to ￿rst decile in the prose literacy test performance varies from 1.4 for Denmark
to 1.9 for the USA (p.18). Similar ￿gures can be obtained from the OECD Programme
for International Student Assessment (PISA 2006). As to the heterogeneity in public
and private education expenditures, for an OECD average of 4.7% and 1.4% of GDP in
2004, we have 6.0% and 0.1% in Finland and 5.1% and 2.3% in the US.4
In this paper, we assume that society can control the degree of elitism of public
education (for a given level of expenditures), and the availability of private supplements
to it. We refer to a school system as elitist if it favors the uppertail of the distribution
of learning capacities. An egalitarian system, on the other hand aims at equalizing
opportunities of successful education. We assume that public authorities can determine
the degree of elitism for instance through the design of school districts, the selection of
4See OECD (2007).
2students leading to their assignment to di⁄erent types of schools at a more or less early
stage, di⁄erential investment in schools and students, selection of teachers, etc. Private
supplementary education consists for instance of private tutoring which can range from
informal arrangements with students or teachers to fully ￿ edged professional tutoring.5
Its availability can be a⁄ected by either making it tax deductible or by modifying the
way public education programs are run (full day schedule or not). For instance, during
the 2007 presidential elections in France, the socialist candidate has proposed to make
it more di¢ cult for public sector teachers to moonlight in the private sector and o⁄er
parents educational support after the regular public school hours. For simplicity, we
assume that the availability of supplementary private education is a binary decision: it
can either be allowed or forbidden. The degree of elitism of public education, on the
other hand, is a continuous choice variable.
We consider two possible social objectives: utilitarian welfare and social mobility.
These two objectives are often referred to in the assessment of education systems. For in-
stance, Jesson (2007) studies both students performance and socioeconomic background
in his recent assessment of England￿ s grammar schools. He obtains that, although ￿one
notable feature of the grammar schools is the high performance of their pupils in ex-
ams, [...they] do not o⁄er a ladder of opportunity to any but a very small number of
disadvantaged pupils.￿
Our objective is to develop a simple model that illustrates how stark the con￿ ict
between welfare maximization and social mobility can be in the determination of the
optimal degree of elitism of public education, and how this degree of elitism is a⁄ected
by the availability of private supplementary education.6 The setting is the simplest one
which can represent the main e⁄ects in a meaningful way. Within a two-skill setting
5Empirically, supplementary private education is important in many countries, and is on the rise:
￿Private supplementary tutoring has long been a major phenomenon in parts of East Asia, including
Japan, Hong Kong, South Korea and Taiwan. In recent times it has grown dramatically in other parts of
Asia and in Africa, Europe and North America￿(Bray, 2005, p.1). Bray (2007) contains data that show
the important scale of private supplementary tutoring in several countries, from Brazil to Zimbabwe,
including Cambodia, Egypt, Japan and Malta.
6These two objectives appear to be con￿ icting in many countries and particularly in France and
Germany. However, this is not necessarily the case. A good counterexample is provided by Finland
where we simultaneously observe high social mobility, a high share of top performers and a high average
performance; see e.g., PISA (2006), p. 184￿ 5 and 189￿ 90.
3we assume that skilled parents are more likely to have skilled children than unskilled
parents. When the educational policy becomes more elitist, the probability that a skilled
parent has a child that is skilled as well increases and the probability that an unskilled
parent has a skilled child decreases.
We ￿rst study the optimal degree of elitism when private educational supplements
are not available. Utilitarian welfare increases with the steady state proportion of
skilled agents which, in turn, increases with the degree of elitism of the public education
system. On the other hand, elitism decreases the steady state proportion of heterogenous
dynasties (those comprised of a skilled parent and an unskilled child, or vice versa) which
is our measure of social mobility. Consequently, social mobility is maximized under the
least elitist public education system, in stark contrast with the most elitist system
implying maximum welfare.
We then open up the possibility for skilled parents to invest in private supplementary
education for their child. We assume that private education e¢ ciency is larger when the
public education system is more egalitarian (i.e., less elitist). We study the impact of
private education on the trade-o⁄between social mobility and welfare. We show that the
degree of elitism that maximizes social mobility increases, while the welfare-maximizing
degree of elitism decreases, provided that the high skilled parents￿productivity is large
enough. We provide a numerical example where the ranking between the welfare- and
mobility-maximizing degree of elitism is reversed when private education is allowed ￿
i.e., where the public education system that maximizes social mobility is more elitist
than the one that maximizes welfare. Finally, we show that utilitarian welfare is always
(weakly) higher when private supplementary education is available. On the other hand,
to maximize social mobility it may be preferable to ban private supplements.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and
Section 3 gives the optimal choice of elitism in the absence of private education. Private
education is introduced in Section 4 and a numerical example is given in Section 5.
42 The Model
Individuals care for their own consumption (c) and the educational attainment (a, as
in altruism) of their (unique) child. All individuals have the same utility function
U(c;a) = u(c) + v(a);
with u0 > 0, u00 ￿ 0, v0 > 0 and v00 < 0:
There are two types of individuals: high productivity/wage/income,wH, and low pro-
ductivity, wL with wL < wH. Educational attainment a measures the child￿ s probability
to achieve a high productivity. This probability depends on the parent￿ s productivity
level and on a parameter ￿ 2 [0;1], which characterizes the degree of elitism of education
policy. Observe that education policy is not represented by the level of expenditures
which is implicitly assumed to be given. Instead, education policies are di⁄erentiated
by their degree of elitism.
Formally, a child￿ s probability of achieving a high productivity is given by ￿i(￿),
0 ￿ ￿i(￿) ￿ 1, where the index i 2 fL;Hg refers to the parent￿ s ability level. When
￿ = 0 the education system is egalitarian in the sense that ￿H(0) = ￿L(0) = ￿ p. We
assume (i) ￿H(￿) ￿ ￿L(￿) and (ii) ￿0
H > 0 and ￿0
L < 0: Assumption (i) states that
a child with a high productivity parent never has a lower probability of achieving wH
than a child with a low productivity parent. In other words, high productivity parents
are more likely to have high productivity children than low productivity parents. This
illustrates the importance of family background and of social, family-related skills which
increase the productivity of formal education (see Introduction). The second assumption
implies that the educational attainment function increases with ￿ for the children of
high productivity parents and decreases for those of low ability parents.
To complete the characterization of the attainment function de￿ne
pH = ￿H(1) and pL = ￿L(1) (1)
with pH > ￿ p ￿ pL. Figure 1 depicts the relation ￿i(￿) starting at ￿ p for ￿ = 0 and
ending at pH = ￿H(1) > ￿ p ￿ pL = ￿L(1):7
7To draw this Figure, we use the functional forms presented in Section 5.
5Insert Figure 1 around here
Fig.1: ￿L and ￿H (dashed) in the absence of private education
Our timeline spans several generations, so that the proportion of high type individ-
uals in one generation is a function of the proportion in the previous generation and of
￿L(￿) and ￿H(￿). Let p denote this proportion of high skilled individuals; its steady
state level satis￿es
p = (1 ￿ p)￿L(￿) + p￿H(￿);
so that the steady state level p￿(￿) is given by
p￿(￿) =
￿L(￿)
1 + ￿L(￿) ￿ ￿H(￿)
: (2)
We have that p￿(0) = ￿ p and, using (1)
p￿(1) =
pL
1 + pL ￿ pH
:
Di⁄erentiating (2) shows that p￿ is not necessarily a monotonic function of ￿, precisely
because increasing ￿ decreases ￿L. If p￿ were to decrease with ￿, there would be no
con￿ ict between welfare- and social-mobility maximization (see footnote 11 below). In
order to introduce a con￿ ict between these two objectives, we assume throughout the
paper that
p￿0(￿) > 0 8￿ 2 [0;1]: (3)
In words, we assume that a more elitist public education system increases the steady
state proportion of skilled individuals. Intuitively, this requires that the bene￿t that
high skilled parents derive from an increase in the degree of elitism of public education
is large compared to the cost that it entails for low skilled parents (i.e., that ￿0
H be large
compared to ￿0
L, in absolute values).
3 The optimal level of ￿
We use a transition matrix where rows denote the ability level of the parent while
columns denote the child￿ s ability. Each cell contains the corresponding proportion of
the child population.
6Child￿ s ability
Parent￿ s ability wL wH
wL (1 ￿ p￿(￿))(1 ￿ ￿L(￿)) (1 ￿ p￿(￿))￿L(￿)
wH p￿(￿)(1 ￿ ￿H(￿)) p￿(￿)￿H(￿)
Table 1: Proportion of families according to ability levels of parent and child
The cells (wL;wL) and (wH;wH) represent the homogenous dynasties (no social
mobility). The remaining cells represent heterogenous dynasties (who experience mo-
bility). The proportion of dynasties with upward mobility is given in cell (wL;wH) while
dynasties counted in cell (wH;wL) experience downward mobility. Observe that the de-
￿nition of p￿(￿) as steady state level implies (1 ￿ p￿(￿))￿L(￿) = p￿(￿)(1 ￿ ￿H(￿)).
Given that p￿0(￿) > 0, ￿0
L(￿) < 0 and ￿0
H(￿) > 0; an increase in ￿ increases the pro-
portion of homogenous skilled dynasties and decreases the proportion of heterogeneous
dynasties. The impact of ￿ on the proportion of homogenous unskilled dynasties can
go either way.
We consider two possible social objectives: social welfare maximization and social
mobility (maximization of a mobility index). These two objectives are respectively
denoted by W(￿) and M(￿): We now study the two objectives W(￿) and M(￿) in
turn.
Social welfare W(￿) is utilitarian and expressed as8
W(￿) = (1 ￿ p￿(￿))u(wL) + p￿(￿)u(wH): (4)
Di⁄erentiating (4) yields
W0(￿) = p￿0(￿)(u(wH) ￿ u(wL)) > 0:
Not surprisingly it thus appears that utilitarian welfare is maximized when the steady
state proportion of high type individuals is at its maximum level. With p￿0(￿) > 0, the
optimal value of ￿ is then given by ￿W = 1.
8Observe that we launder the individual preferences in the sense that we do not take into account
the impact of ￿ on v(:). See on this Hammond (1987) and Andreoni (2006). This is a standard, albeit
sometimes debated assumption. It is made to avoid ￿double-counting￿ of altruistic considerations in
social welfare. We discuss in Section 5 how our results would be a⁄ected if we did not launder preferences.
7Let us now turn to the mobility index M(￿) which is de￿ned as the proportion of
heterogenous dynasties in the steady state9
M(￿) = (1 ￿ p￿(￿))￿L(￿) + p￿(￿)(1 ￿ ￿H(￿)) = 2(1 ￿ p￿(￿))￿L(￿): (5)
Di⁄erentiating (5) shows that
M0(￿) < 0;
given that ￿0
L < 0 and p￿0(￿) > 0. Social mobility as measured by the index M is thus
maximized when ￿ = ￿M = 0.10
These results are summarized in the following proposition.11
Proposition 1 In the absence of supplementary private education, and under assump-
tion (3), the maximization of utilitarian social welfare yields the most elitist public ed-
ucation system (￿W = 1) while social mobility is maximum when the least elitist public
education system is adopted (￿M = 0).
4 Introducing private education
We now open up the possibility for high ability parents to invest in (supplementary)
private education in order to increase the probability that their child be highly produc-
tive. We assume that low ability parents never invest in private education.12 Formally
9Alternatively, we could have used the more sophisticated approach advocated by Atkinson and
Bourguignon (1982) or Gottschalk and Spolaore (2002) which model the concern for mobility as aversion
to multi-period inequality. Our more pedestrian approach is much easier to deal with analytically,
especially since we want to contrast the results obtained with a purely welfarist planner and with a
planner only interested in social mobility. It is true that the objective of maximum social mobility,
reached when all skilled parents have unskilled children, and vice versa, may not look very appealing
to everyone. Observe that we never attain this situation in our model, since the probability to have a
high skilled child is always weakly higher for high skilled than for low skilled parents.
10When ￿ = 0, the probability of being highly skilled is the same for both types of parents. This
corresponds to a perfect equality of opportunities (where your situation in life is independent of your
parent￿ s). In this sense, Proposition 1 continues to holds when we replace the objective of social mobility
maximization by one of equalization of opportunities.
11As mentioned earlier, if p
￿0(￿) < 0 there would be no trade-o⁄between e¢ ciency and social mobility.
Adopting a more egalitarian system would enhance both welfare and mobility.
12This assumption is made to simplify the exposition. In reality, as the Director of UNESCO￿ s
International Institute for Educationnal Planning writes: ￿Families with the necessary resources are
able to secure not only greater quantities but also better qualities of private tutoring. Children receiving
such tutoring are then able to perform better in school, and in the long run to improve their lifetime
earnings. By contrast, children of low-income families who do not receive such bene￿ts may not be able
8￿H is now (rede￿ned as) a function of expenditure on private education, e, and ￿, while
￿L continues to be a function of the sole variable ￿.
In the remainder of the paper we will also adopt speci￿c functional forms for these
expressions. Let
￿H(￿;e) = (1 ￿ ￿)(￿ p + e) + ￿pH; (6)
so that private education is especially e¢ cient when ￿ is low ￿ i.e., when the public
school system is very egalitarian. The rationale for this assumption is that an an elitist
public system already invests more in brighter kids, so that the marginal bene￿ts they
could obtain from additional private education is low. An egalitarian public system,
on the other hand, does not devote extra resources to brighter students, who may then
bene￿t a lot from additional private education. The function ￿L continues to be speci￿ed
by
￿L(￿) = (1 ￿ ￿)￿ p + ￿pL: (7)
We further assume from now on that u(c) = ln(c) and that v(d) = ln(d).13
We start by solving for the individual decision of how much to invest in private
education.
4.1 The private education choice
We assume a constant price, normalized to one, for private education services. High
productivity individuals solve the following problem:
max
e u(wH ￿ e) + v(￿H(￿;e));
where wH ￿ e denotes the consumption level of a type H once the private education
cost e is subtracted from income wH. The ￿rst-order condition with respect to e is
u0(c) = v0(d)(1 ￿ ￿);
to keep up with their peers and may drop out of school at an earlier age.￿(Bray, 2005, p.1) We discuss
the robustness of our results to this assumption in the concluding section.
13We need to introduce a functional form in order to solve explicitly for the individually optimal
supplementary education level.




(wH ￿ ￿ p ￿
￿
1 ￿ ￿
pH) if ￿ ￿ ~ ￿ =
wH ￿ ￿ p
wH + pH ￿ ￿ p
< 1;
= 0 if ￿ > ~ ￿,
where eo denotes the most preferred value of e of a high ability individual. We assume
that wH > ￿ p so that eo(0) > 0:14 It is clear that eo0(￿) < 0 when ￿ < ~ ￿. Intuitively,
since the e¢ ciency of private education decreases with ￿, so does the optimal amount of
private education bought by skilled parents. The individually optimal private education
amount increases with the individual￿ s income wH (since a larger wH decreases the
marginal utility from consumption, and thus the marginal utility cost of investing in
supplementary education) and decreases with both pH and ￿ p (because increasing either
pH or ￿ p increases the probability of raising a high-skilled child for any given private
education level, making private education less attractive at the margin).15 We then
have that ~ ￿ increases with wH and decreases with both pH and ￿ p:
Substituting eo(￿) into ￿H(￿;e) yields
￿o




(￿ p(1 ￿ ￿) + wH(1 ￿ ￿) + pH￿) if ￿ ￿ ~ ￿;
= ￿H(￿;0) = (1 ￿ ￿)￿ p + ￿pH if ￿ > ~ ￿.
This function is linear in two parts. Skilled parents buy private education provided
that its marginal productivity is large enough ￿ i.e., that the public education system
is not too elitist (￿ < ~ ￿). As long as ￿ < ~ ￿, increasing ￿ has two e⁄ects of opposite
signs on ￿o
H. On the one hand, the public education system becomes more elitist, which
increases ￿H for a given value of e. On the other hand, skilled parents buy less private
education, which decreases ￿H, for a given ￿. With our formulation, the net e⁄ect
cannot be signed without additional assumptions on ￿ p, pH and wH: ￿o
H decreases with
￿ if wH is large enough (wH > pH ￿￿ p), because a large value of wH ampli￿es the second
e⁄ect. As ￿ increases above ~ ￿, the second e⁄ect disappears (since skilled agents do not
14If it were not the case, nobody would ever buy private education and the analysis contained in the
previous section would carry through.
15A higher value of ￿ p could be associated, for instance, with a higher quality/level of public education.
10buy private education for large values of ￿) and ￿o
H increases with ￿, as in the previous
section.
The steady state proportion of high ability individuals is now a function of ￿ and e.




1 + ￿L(￿) ￿ ￿o
H(￿)
: (9)
When ￿ > ~ ￿ (so that eo(￿) = 0) and for the functional forms de￿ned by (6) and (7)
this steady state proportion is then given by
p￿(￿) =
￿ p ￿ ￿(￿ p ￿ pL)
1 ￿ ￿(pH ￿ pL)
: (10)
We make the same assumption as in the previous section, namely that the steady state
proportion of high type individuals is increasing in ￿ when the spending on private
education is zero. Di⁄erentiating expression (10) shows that this is the case when
pL(1 ￿ ￿ p) ￿ ￿ p(1 ￿ pH) > 0; (11)
a condition which is satis￿ed when pH or pL are high enough.
When ￿ ￿ ~ ￿, on the other hand, private education spending is positive and the
expression for p￿ is more complicated so that p￿ may well be a decreasing function of ￿.
Figure 2 illustrates this possibility. It depicts ￿o
H(￿) (dashed curve); p￿(￿) (thick curve)
and ￿L(￿) (thin curve) for pL = 0:3, pH = 0:8, ￿ p = 0:5, wL = 0:33 and wH = 1 (the
values upon which the simulations of section 5 are based). These values satisfy condition
(11) so that p increases when private education spending is zero (when ￿ > ~ ￿). For
low values of ￿ on the other hand, when high type individuals buy private education,
the steady state proportion of high type individuals is decreasing in ￿: we have ￿o
H
decreasing in a for ￿ < ~ ￿ (since wH > pH ￿ ￿ p), which is a su¢ cient (although not
necessary) condition to have p￿0 < 0 over this range of values of ￿.
Insert Figure 2 around here
Probabilities of a high productivity child when private education is available.
114.2 The level of elitism
We ￿rst consider a utilitarian welfare function given by
WPE(￿) = (1 ￿ p￿(￿))u(wL) + p￿(￿)u(wH ￿ eo(￿)): (12)
This expression di⁄ers from (4) in two aspects that re￿ ect the impact of private educa-
tion spending. First, the utility level of the high productivity individuals now depends
on ￿ and, second, p￿(￿) is now de￿ned by (9). Consequently, maximizing social welfare
is no longer equivalent to maximizing p￿. Observe that as in the previous section, we
launder utilities and do not take into account the utility parents obtain from the prob-
ability that their kid is of a high type. The (laundered) utility of the high productivity





(1 ￿ ￿)((1 ￿ ￿)(￿ p + wH) + pH￿)
> 0 if ￿ < ~ ￿;
= 0 if ￿ > ~ ￿:
As the public education system becomes more elitist (up to ~ ￿), high type individuals
invest less in private education and rely more exclusively on public education. Conse-
quently, their (laundered) utility increases. The utility of low type individuals, on the
other hand, remains independent of ￿. Finally, recall that by assumption (3) the steady
state proportion of high type individuals increases with ￿ when ￿ > ~ ￿.
Putting these observations together, we obtain
Proposition 2 With private education and p￿0(￿) > 0 for
￿ > ~ ￿ =
wH ￿ ￿ p
wH + pH ￿ ￿ p
;
the level of ￿ (denoted ￿W) that maximizes utilitarian welfare, is either equal to one
or belongs to [0; ~ ￿]. Consequently, we can exclude ￿W 2]~ ￿;1[: Moreover, a necessary
condition to obtain ￿W ￿ ~ ￿ is that
wH > ~ wH = 2 ￿




Proposition 2 states that a large value of wH is necessary for a somewhat egalitarian
system with e⁄ective private education (￿ < ~ ￿) to yield a higher level of welfare than
an elitist system without any private education at equilibrium (￿ = 1). This property
can easily be understood. The consumption level of a high ability type is lower when
he invests in private education. A low level of ￿ (inducing positive private education
spending) can thus only yield a higher level of welfare than ￿ = 1 when it implies a larger
steady state proportion of high productivity individuals. This proportion increases with
wH when ￿ is low, because richer parents buy more private education. Proposition 2
provides a lower bound ~ wH on wH that guarantees that the steady state proportion
of high skilled agents is larger with e⁄ective private education. This bound depends
upon the three determinants of the functions ￿L and ￿H, namely ￿ p, pL and pH. More
precisely, ~ wH decreases with ￿ p because a larger value of ￿ p increases the steady state
proportion of high-skilled people with a very egalitarian public system (taking into
account the amount of supplementary education chosen by high-skilled parents) but
not with a very elitist system, making the egalitarian public education scheme more
attractive. Similarly, ~ wH increases with pL and pH because they both increase the
steady state proportion of high-skilled type with a purely elitist public system but not
with an egalitarian one, making the public education scheme with ￿ = 1 more attractive.
The next section provides a numerical example where social welfare is larger with an
elitist system without e⁄ective private education if wH is low while an egalitarian system
with private education is preferred if wH is large enough.
We now turn to the maximization of the social mobility index which continues
to be de￿ned by (5) but with p￿(￿) rede￿ned by (9). Recall that this index simply
measures the proportion of heterogeneous dynasties which at the steady state is given
by 2(1 ￿ p￿)￿L(￿) (see Table 1). Social mobility is decreasing on [~ ￿;1] because p￿
increases with ￿ over that range, while ￿L decreases. When ￿ < ~ ￿, social mobility may
increase or decrease with ￿, because the steady state proportion of unskilled individuals
may increase with ￿, while ￿L decreases with ￿. We then obtain
13Welfare Social Mobility
No PE ￿W= 1 ￿M= 0
PE ￿W = 1 when wH is not too large ￿M 2 [0; ~ ￿] and weakly increases
￿W 2 [0; ~ ￿[ only when wH large enough with wH when wH is large enough
Table 2: Main results, without and with private education (PE), according to the social
objective (welfare or mobility).
Proposition 3 With private education and p￿0(￿) > 0 for ￿ > ~ ￿, the level of ￿ (denoted
￿M) that maximizes social mobility belongs to [0; ~ ￿] . Consequently, social mobility is
maximized when private education is e⁄ective (high type individuals invest in private
education). Moreover, the value of ￿M is weakly increasing with wH if wH is large
enough (wH > pH ￿ ￿ p).
Proof: See Appendix
Recall that, without private education, both the steady state proportion of low
ability types (1￿p￿) and the proportion of agents with a low ability parent who achieve
a high productivity (￿L) decrease with ￿. This explains why the steady state proportion
of heterogeneous dynasties decreases with ￿, and why social mobility is maximized with
a purely egalitarian public education (￿ = 0). When private education is introduced, an
increase in ￿ induces high ability agents to reduce their investment in private education
(because its return is lower with a more elitist public system) and this may increase
the steady state proportion of low type individuals, resulting in a larger number of
heterogenous dynasties. Furthermore, a larger value of wH reinforces this impact of ￿
on the steady state proportion of low type individuals, so that ￿M weakly increases
with wH. Table 2 summarizes our results.
It is straightforward that utilitarian welfare may only increase when private educa-
tion becomes available. The welfare level for ￿W = 1 is the same under both systems
(high productivity individuals do not buy private education when ￿ = 1 > ~ ￿). Con-
sequently, when ￿W < 1 is chosen when private education is available it must yield a
larger welfare level. As for social mobility, the allocation chosen when private education
is not available is no longer feasible when private education is introduced. Consequently,
14we cannot be certain that social mobility16 increases when private education becomes
available.
These results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 (i) If the income of the high skilled is small enough, the availability
of private education does not a⁄ect ￿W nor ￿M. (ii) If the high-skilled income is large
enough, the availability of private education may decrease ￿W while increasing ￿M. (iii)
The maximum welfare level when private education is available is the same as without
private education if the high skilled income is small enough, and may be larger if the high
skilled income is large enough. Consequently, with a welfarist social objective it is never
desirable to forbid private educational supplements. (iv) The maximum level of social
mobility may be lower with private education, whatever the income of the high skilled.
Consequently, when the objective is to maximize social mobility it may be desirable to
forbid private educational supplements.
5 Numerical example
We now resort to numerical simulations, with several objectives in mind. First, we
would like to show that the introduction of private education may e⁄ectively strictly
decrease ￿W (provided that the high skilled income is large enough) and strictly increase
￿M. Second, the analytical results do not show whether the ranking of the degrees of
elitism achieved under the two social objectives may be reversed when private educa-
tion is introduced. We do know that ￿M = 0 < ￿W = 1 in the absence of private
education. But can we have ￿M > ￿W once private education is introduced? Third,
numerical examples allow us to compare absolute levels and to determine, for instance,
whether social mobility of welfare is improved when we allow for supplementary private
education. They also enable us to perform a comparative static analysis of the optimum
welfare or social mobility levels with respect to high skill productivity, accounting for
the induced changes in the degree of elitism. Finally, the numerical examples show how
robust our results are to the laundering of utilities when computing social welfare.
16Or equalization of opportunities, for that matter.
15wH ￿M M(￿
M) p￿(￿M) ￿W W(￿
W) p￿(￿W)
0.6 0 0.5 0.5 1 -0.750 0.6
0.65 0 0.5 0.5 1 -0.702 0.6
0.8 0 0.5 0.5 1 -0.577 0.6
1 0 0.5 0.5 1 -0.443 0.6
1.1 0 0.5 0.5 1 -0.386 0.6
1.15 0 0.5 0.5 1 -0.360 0.6
1.3 0 0.5 0.5 1 -0.286 0.6
1.5 0 0.5 0.5 1 -0.200 0.6
Table 3: No private education
We adopt the logarithmic utility functions and the parameters of the linear proba-
bility functions (6) and (7) are given by pL = 0:3, pH = 0:8, ￿ p = 0:5 . Finally we set
wL = 0:33, while wH varies from 0:6 to 1:5.
Table 3 studies the case without private education and reports, for several values
of wH, the values of ￿M and the corresponding social mobility level and steady state
proportion p￿ attained, and the value of ￿W with the welfare level and value of p￿
reached in that case. The social mobility maximizing policy does not depend upon
wH, and is such that ￿M = 0 (see Proposition 1) and that one half of families are
heterogenous at the steady state equilibrium.17 This also corresponds to the allocation
equalizing opportunities, since all children have a 50% probability of being highly skilled,
independently of the status of their parent. The steady state proportion of skilled agents
is also 50% in that case. The welfare-maximizing value of ￿ is equal to one, whatever
the value of wH (see Proposition 1). We have reported the maximum value of welfare
(as given by equation (4)) attained, which is of course increasing in wH. The underlying
steady state proportion of high skilled type remains constant at 60% for all values of
wH.
Table 4 reports the same information as Table 3, but in the case where private
supplementary education is available to high skilled parents. We start by looking at
the objective of social mobility maximization. When the highly skilled people are less
17This means that 25% of families have a skilled parent and an unskilled child, while another 25%
have a low skill parent and a high skill child.
16than roughly twice as rich as low-skilled agents (wH < 0:65), we have ￿M = 0 as in the
case without private education. The value of ￿M then increases with wH; in accordance
with Proposition 3. Comparing the third columns of Tables 4 and 3, shows that the
maximum level of social mobility is always strictly lower when private education is
available than when it is not. As explained in Proposition 4, the original optimal
allocation without private education is not available anymore when private education
is introduced. We can distinguish three cases in our example. When wH is low (wH =
0:6), ￿M remains at zero, as in Table 3. Social mobility is lower in Table 4 because
high skilled parents do buy private education, which increases both the probability
that their children are highly skilled and the steady state proportion of high skilled
agents (compare the fourth columns of Tables 3 and 4). When wH is intermediate
(wH = 0:65 in Tables 3 and 4), the social-mobility maximizing value of ￿ is higher
with than without supplementary education, and private education is bought at the
optimum (i.e., 0 < ￿M < ~ ￿). Compared to Table 3, the planner increases the value of
￿ to mitigate the negative impact of high skilled parents buying private education on
social mobility. With higher values of wH (wH ￿ 0:8), the mobility-maximizing value
of ￿ is equal to ~ ￿, meaning that no private education is bought at equilibrium. In that
case, the social planner increases the degree of elitism of the public education system in
order to prevent high skilled parents from buying private education. We then obtain that
social mobility is decreasing in wH, because the public education system has to be made
more elitist to prevent high skilled families from buying private education as they get
richer. Interestingly, it is the mere availability of supplementary private education that
drives the public education system to be more elitist and that decreases the maximum
social mobility level, and not whether supplementary education is actually bought at
optimum or not.
Also interestingly, even though the maximum social mobility level is monotonically
decreasing in wH, the steady state proportion of high skilled agents is not, since it ￿rst
decreases and then increases with wH. Observe that it increases with wH when ￿ = ~ ￿
at the optimum. This is intuitive, since ￿M = ~ ￿ increases with wH, and since p￿0(￿) > 0
when no private education is bought (irrespective of the value of wH). For low values of
17wH ￿M M(￿
M) p￿(￿M) ￿W W(￿
W) p￿(￿W)
0.6 0 0.474 0.526 1 -0.750 0.6
0.65 0.118 0.461 0.517 1 -0.702 0.6
0.8 0.273 0.431 0.516 1 -0.577 0.6
1 0.385 0.402 0.524 1 -0.443 0.6
1.1 0.429 0.391 0.527 1 -0.386 0.6
1.15 0.448 0.385 0.529 1 -0.360 0.6
1.3 0.500 0.373 0.533 0 -0.273 0.833
1.5 0.556 0.358 0.538 0 0 1
Table 4: Private education allowed
wH, we have that the individually optimal amount of private education decreases when
￿ increases, and the impact of this e⁄ect is larger than the direct impact of increasing
wH, leading to a lower value of p￿. Finally, observe that the steady state proportion
of high skilled individuals is always strictly larger in Table 4 than in Table 3, whatever
the value of wH.
We now move to the welfare maximizing objective (last three columns of Tables 4
and 3). As predicted by Proposition 2, the welfare-maximizing value of ￿ remains at one
when wH is low enough (wH ￿ 1:15 in our example, while ~ wH = 5=6) but jumps from one
to zero when wH is large enough (wH ￿ 1:3 here). The maximum welfare level remains
the same as in Table 3 when wH is low enough so that ￿W is unchanged. It is strictly
larger when ￿W is zero in Table 4: as explained in Proposition 4, the welfare maximizing
allocation without private education remains attainable when supplementary education
is introduced. Consequently, if the optimal value of ￿ is changed (here, decreased from
one to zero) when private education is introduced, the new allocation must correspond
to a strictly larger welfare level. Similarly, the steady state proportion of high skilled
agents is the same in Tables 3 and 4 when wH is low enough. It is larger in Table 4
when ￿W equals zero, since Proposition 2 has shown that p￿(0) > p￿(1) is a necessary
condition for a low value of ￿ to be preferred to one when private education is introduced.
Finally, p￿ is increasing with wH when wH is large enough for ￿W to be equal to zero.
In our simulation, it reaches the maximum value of one when wH = 1:5.
To summarize the main results from Table 3 and 4, allowing private education is,
18in our example, always detrimental for social mobility. This is true whatever the value
of wH and irrespective of whether supplementary education is e⁄ectively bought when
available. Allowing private education is at worst innocuous and at best bene￿cial for
a welfare maximizing planner, provided that high skilled parents are rich enough. The
optimal degree of elitism of the public education system is e⁄ectively larger in our
example for a mobility maximizing than for a welfare maximizing planner, provided
once more than high skilled parents are rich enough.
Numerical examples give us the opportunity to discuss how our results would be
a⁄ected if we did not launder preferences in the de￿nition of social welfare. Observe ￿rst
that several of our theoretical results would, in any event, not be a⁄ected. Obviously,
the analysis of social mobility maximization would not be a⁄ected: ￿M remains equal
to zero in the absence of private education, while Proposition 3 continues to hold when
supplementary education is available. As for welfare maximization, unlaundered welfare,
given by
WNL(￿) = p￿(￿)(u(wH) + v(￿H(￿))) + (1 ￿ p￿(￿))(u(wL) + v(￿L(￿)));
remains increasing in ￿ in the absence of private education (i.e., Proposition 1 holds)
provided that the sub-utility function v(a) (pertaining to the educational achievement
of the child) is not too concave.18 This is con￿rmed by Table 5, which reports welfare-
maximizing results for the exact same speci￿cation as for Tables 3 and 4, except that
social welfare is not laundered. The ￿rst columns of Table 5 show that ￿W = 1 when
preferences are not laundered. The only di⁄erence between Tables 3 and 5 is the actual
welfare level reached when ￿ = 1.19
Proposition 2 also remains valid: the intuition as to why a large value of wH is
necessary for the welfare-maximizing value of ￿ to be lower than ~ ￿ remains essentially
the same (since the laundered utility of high skilled agents is increasing in ￿ for ￿ < ~ ￿),20
18The impact of ￿ on unlaundered welfare is threefold: it decreases v(a) for low skilled agents but
increases both the steady state proportion of high skilled (and thus high utility) agents and v(a) for
high skilled parents. If the function v(a) is not too concave, the ￿rst (negative) impact of a higher ￿ on
welfare is less than the sum of the other two (positive) impacts.
19Welfare levels are lower in Table 5 since we add v(a) to those reported in Table 3, with a < 1 (since
it is a probability) and v(a) = log(a).
20As long as @￿H(￿;e)=@￿ > 0, i.e., when pH > ￿ p + e:
19No private education Private education allowed
wH ￿W WNL(￿
W) p￿(￿W) ￿W WNL(￿
W) p￿(￿W)
0.6 1 -1.365 0.6 1 -1.365 0.600
0.65 1 -1.317 0.6 1 -1.317 0.600
0.8 1 -1.193 0.6 1 -1.193 0.600
1 1 -1.059 0.6 0 -0.984 0.667
1.1 1 -1.002 0.6 0 -0.834 0.714
1.15 1 -0.975 0.6 0 -0.752 0.741
1.3 1 -0.902 0.6 0 -0.476 0.833
1.5 1 -0.816 0.6 0 0 1
Table 5: Table 5: Without laundering
although the analytical determination of the lower-bound on wH is made very complex.
This is con￿rmed by Table 5, where the optimal value of ￿W jumps from 1 when wH is
low (up to 0:8) to 0 for a large enough wH (larger than 1). Tables 5 and 4 also show that
the value of wH above which ￿W = 0 is lower without laundering of preferences than
with laundering. The intuition is that private education increases the probability that
one￿ s child is highly productive, which gives additional utility to the parent through the
sub-utility function v(a). Under laundering this positive impact of private education is
neglected, which biases the value of ￿W towards one. Finally, as with laundering, the
maximum welfare level attained is higher with private education when ￿W < 1, as can
be seen from a comparison of the third and penultimate columns in Table 5.
In conclusion, our analysis is robust to whether we launder utilities or not in the
de￿nition of social welfare. However, as our numerical example illustrates, the speci￿c
value of ￿W that is chosen for a given value of wH may of course di⁄er.
6 Conclusion
We have considered two alternative objectives of education policy: utilitarian welfare
and social mobility. These two issues are often referred to in the assessment of education
systems. We have developed a simple model that studies the determination of the degree
of elitism of public education. It has shown that there may be a stark con￿ ict between
welfare maximization and social mobility.
20We have ￿rst studied the optimal degree of elitism when private educational sup-
plements are not available. Utilitarian welfare increases with the degree of elitism of
the public education system. On the other hand, elitism decreases the steady state
proportion of heterogenous dynasties (those comprised of a skilled parent and an un-
skilled child, or vice versa) which is our measure of social mobility. Consequently, social
mobility is maximized under the least elitist public education system.
Next, we have introduced the possibility that skilled parents invest in private supple-
mentary education. We have shown that the appropriate degree of elitism now depends
on induced adjustment in private education. In particular, an egalitarian system may
be welfare maximizing while some degree of elitism may be good for mobility. Both re-
sults occur because an elitist system discourages private education expenditures. More
precisely, we have shown that the degree of elitism that maximizes social mobility in-
creases, while the welfare-maximizing degree of elitism decreases, provided that high
skilled productivity is large enough. We have provided a numerical example where the
ranking between the welfare- and mobility-maximizing degree of elitism is reversed when
private education is allowed, i.e., where the public education system that maximizes so-
cial mobility is more elitist than the one that maximizes welfare. Finally, we have shown
that utilitarian welfare never decreases when private supplementary education becomes
available. However, to maximize social mobility it may be preferable to ban private
supplements.
Our analysis is based on a number of simplifying assumptions. We now comment on
three of them and look at the robustness of our results to changes in these assumptions.
First, the assumption that low skilled parents do not buy supplementary private edu-
cation is admittedly strong; it is made to simplify the algebra. Our results would carry
through when both low- and high- ability parents are allowed to buy supplementary pri-
vate education, as we now explain. The simplest way to extend our model to this case
would be to modify the function ￿L(￿) in the same way as we have modi￿ed the function
￿H(￿) at the beginning of Section 4, to obtain ￿L(￿;e) = (1￿￿)(￿ p+e)+￿pL: We would
then need to introduce two threshold levels of ~ ￿, denoted by ~ ￿L and ~ ￿H, above which,
respectively, low- and high-skilled parents do not buy private education. Our results
21that a large value of wH is necessary to have i) a low value of the welfare-maximizing
public education elitism degree and ii) a value of the social mobility maximizing degree
of elitism that increases with wH would both remain correct.
Second, our objective of maximum social mobility, reached when all skilled parents
have unskilled children, and vice versa, may not look very appealing to everyone. Ob-
serve that we never attain this situation in our model, since the probability to have
a high skilled child is never lower for high skilled than for low skilled parents. The
largest degree of social mobility that we attain at equilibrium is one where the prob-
ability of being highly skilled is the same for both types of parents. This corresponds
to an objective of perfect equality of opportunity (where your situation in life is in-
dependent of your parent￿ s), which is probably easier to defend on normative grounds
than the one of maximizing social mobility. Social mobility maximization and equal-
ization of opportunities yields the same results when private education is not available.
With the availability of private education, Figure 2 shows that perfect equalization of
opportunities is not within reach anymore.21 In that sense, the result that a planner
bent on maximizing social mobility may wish to forbid supplementary private education
(unlike a welfarist planner) remains correct when the planner￿ s objective is changed to
equalizing opportunities.
Finally, we have also shown in section 5 that most of our results are robust to the
assumption that we launder individual utilities when computing social welfare.
In the literature, maximum social welfare has lead many authors to recommend
an elitist and regressive educational policy. In this paper, we have shown that this
recommendation can be challenged when introducing considerations of social mobility.
This is not the only way an elitist policy can be questioned. Here are two examples.
First, one can deem that education not only brings more productivity but has a value
per se. If education were introduced as an argument in the individual utility function,
the case for a regressive educational policy would be weakened. Second, there is also
the e⁄ect of earnings distribution on growth. There exists a rich literature comparing
21It would require an egalitarian public education scheme. This, however, would drive high skilled
parents to invest in private education, which would prevent complete equalization of opportunities.
22the growth incidence of two polar systems of education that can be labeled for short
egalitarian and elitist. The former one tries to induce equalization of human capital
while the latter tends to perpetuate or even exacerbate its initial inequality. Benabou
(1996) addresses the question of which system promotes faster growth. He shows that
their short run e⁄ects are ambiguous, but that in the long run the egalitarian system is
clearly desirable. This suggests that, when growth is accounted for, the con￿ ict between
welfare and mobility may be less drastic than in our setting.
23APPENDIX
A Proof of Proposition 2
First, the optimal value of ￿ cannot belong to ]~ ￿;1[ because the utility of both types
of individuals is constant over this interval while the proportion of high type (and thus
high utility) individuals increases with ￿ over this interval.
Second, the necessity of a large wH to obtain ￿W < 1 is established as follows. A
necessary condition to have ￿W < 1 is
p￿(￿W) > p￿(1) =
pL
1 ￿ pH + pL
;
because ￿W < ~ ￿ < 1: Using equations (2), (7) and (8), we obtain that
p￿(￿W) =
2￿ p(1 ￿ ￿W) + 2pL￿W
2 + ￿ p ￿ wH(1 ￿ ￿W) ￿ ￿W(￿ p + pH ￿ 2pL)
;
which increases with wH. Combining these two expressions shows that a necessary
condition to obtain ￿W < 1 is that
wH > 2 ￿




1 ￿ ￿W pH:
Observe that this lower bound on the value of wH increases with ￿W. If this condition
is satis￿ed for some ￿W < ~ ￿, it thus must also hold for ￿W = 0; so that a necessary
condition to obtain ￿W < 1 is
wH > 2 ￿
￿ p(2(1 ￿ pH) + pL)
pL
:
B Proof of Proposition 3
The problem is given by
max
￿
M(￿) = [1 ￿ p￿(￿)]￿L(￿);
where p￿(￿) is given by (9) and ￿L(￿) by (7). Consequently, when ￿M is an interior
solution it is determined by





























so that @2p￿=@￿@wH < 0 is su¢ cient to yield @￿M=@wH > 0:





































































< 0 and wH > pH ￿ ￿ p:
Using the de￿nitions of ￿L and ￿o















which completes the proof because from (13) @2p￿=@￿@wH < 0 implies @￿M=@wH > 0.
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27Fig .1 : ΦL and ΦH HdashedL in the absence of private education







ProbabilityFig2. : Probabilities of a high productivity child when private education is available.
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